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THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION
OF THE ANTIFRAUD PROVISIONS OF
THE SECURITIES ACTS
It is an established rule of statutory construction that, absent a clear
expression of congressional intent to the contrary, federal legislation will
be presumed to apply only within the territorial limits of the United
States.' During the early 1960's when the first transnational securities
cases arose, the federal courts strictly adhered to this principle. Finding
that nothing in the language or legislative history of the Securities Act of
19332 and the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 suggested that the acts
were to apply extraterritorially, 4 the courts held that they had no subject
matter jurisdiction over securities disputes which were essentially foreign
in nature.5 However, as international securities dealings increased it
became apparent that to refuse to apply United States law in all cases
would dilute the antifraud provisions of the acts6 which were designed to
protect American investors and safeguard the integrity of domestic secu-
rities markets. 7
I. A statute is to be construed "as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to
the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power." American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909); accord, Steele v. Bulova Watch
Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285 (1952); Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949);
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421,437 (1932); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519
F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1970).
3. Id. 99 78a-78hh-l.
4. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Ferraioli v. Cantor, [1964-66) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 91,615, at
95,310-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
5. See Ferraioli v. Cantor, [1964-66] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,615 (S.D.N.Y. 1965);
Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
6. The securities acts contain three general antifraud provisions: § 17(a) of the Securities
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1970); § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, id. § 78j(b), and rule lOb-5
promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lob-5 (1977); and § 15(c)(1) of the Exchange Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78(o)(c)(1) (1970). The operation of § 15(c)(1) is limited to over-the-counter
transactions. Most transnational securities fraud cases have been brought under § 10(b) and
rule lOb-5.
7. See, e.g., Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 1977); Schoen-
baum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part on other grounds en banc, 405
F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Venture Fund (Int'l) N.V. v.
Willkie Farr & Gallagher, 418 F.-Supp. 550, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Similarly, courts began to
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This Note will assess the current extraterritorial scope of the American
securities laws. After a review of the major cases which have dealt with
transnational securities fraud, the Third Circuit's recent decision in SEC
v. Kasser8 will be examined. A jurisdictional framework will then be
suggested for determining those instances in which the courts may prop-
erly invoke the protection of the securities acts.
THE EARLY CASES
The extraterritorial application of the securities acts turns upon
whether the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over transna-
tional securities dealings. In determining whether such jurisdiction has
been granted by Congress, the courts first look to the language of the
statute. The Exchange Act and the Securities Act, however, do not
clearly address this issue. 9 The courts, therefore, have sought guidance
from the jurisdictional principles of international law. Although these
principles do not limit the power of Congress to extend legislation ex-
traterritorially,10 the courts consider international law as setting the
apply other statutes extraterritorially in order to effect their legislative purposes. See Note,
Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 28 STAN.
L. REv. 1005, 1009-10 (1976).
8. 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977).
9. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975); Venture Fund (Int'l) N.V. v. Willkie Farr & Gallagher, 418 F. Supp. 550, 554
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). Cf. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334
(2d Cir. 1972) (Exchange Act).
The jurisdictional reach of the two acts is coextensive. Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp.
1189, 1194 (E.D. Pa. 1975). With regard to the Exchange Act, only § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1970), explicitly deals with jurisdiction. This section merely provides that "It]he district
courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and
regulations thereunder .... "
The only express limitation on the extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act
appears in § 30(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (1970), which provides in part that "[t]he provisions of
this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not apply to any person insofar as
he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States .... "
Although often invoked by defendants as exempting their transaction from the coverage of
the act, the section has been construed as exempting only those who conduct an actual
business in securities, namely brokers, dealers, and banks. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 200, 207 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part on other grounds en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421,422 (2d
Cir. 1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969).
10. "[I]f Congress has expressly prescribed a rule with respect to conduct outside the
United States, even one going beyond the scope recognized by foreign relations law, a
United States court would be bound to follow the Congressional direction unless this would
violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." Leasco Data Processing Equip.
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
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boundaries beyond which they are powerless to go in the absence of clear
legislative intent to the contrary.'
Of the five generally recognized jurisdictional bases, 12 the courts have
employed only the territorial principle in transnational securities cases. 3
The opinions have discussed two variations of this principle. The first,
the subjective territorial principle, hereinafter referred to as the conduct
doctrine, bases jurisdiction on conduct within the territorial limits of the
state. 1 4 The situs of the effects flowing from that activity is irrelevant to
the inquiry. 15 On the other hand, the second variation, the objective
territorial principle, hereinafter referred to as the effects doctrine, grants
jurisdiction over acts which cause foreseeable and substantial effects
within the territory regardless of where those acts occurred. 16
The courts have placed varying emphasis on these two jurisdictional
principles. Several courts have apparently required that both domestic
11. "[A]n act of congress [sic] ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains ....- Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 115, 118 (1804); accord, Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
12. In addition to the territorial principle, there are the nationality, protective, univer-
sality, and passive personality principles. A detailed examination of these principles is
beyond the scope of this Note; for a discussion of these principles, see Sahovic & Bishop,
The Authority of the State: Its Range with Respect to Persons and Places, in MANUAL OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 311 (M. Sdrensen ed. 1968); Research in International Law,
Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 443 (Supp. 1935).
13. The only other jurisdictional theory discussed in the opinions is the nationality
principle which, as the name implies, bases jurisdiction solely on the nationality of the
alleged violator. See Research in International Law, supra note 12, at 519. The nationality
principle has been uniformly rejected as a basis for applying the securities acts to transna-
tional securities fraud. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975); Bersch
v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 992 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975);
F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., 400 F. Supp. 1219, 1223 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
14. "A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law. . attaching legal consequences
to conduct that occurs within its territory, whether or not such consequences are determined
by the effects of the conduct outside the territory .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17(a) (1965).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
17, Comment a (1965).
16. This principle was explained in an often quoted statement by Mr. Justice Holmes:
Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental
effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if [the actor] had
been present at the [time of the detrimental] effect, if the State should succeed in
getting him within its power.
Stassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911). An alternative formulation of this principle is
that a state may consider a crime as having been committed in its territory "if one of the
constituent elements of the offence, and more especially its effects, have taken place
there." The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 9, at 23. See also United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,443 (2d Cir. 1945); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965).
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conduct and effect be found."7 Others have purported to apply the tests
alternatively. 8 Despite these seemingly different approaches, there is a
common element running through all of the earlier cases: each case in
which jurisdiction was upheld, regardless of the court's supposed alterna-
tive or concurrent application of the effects and conduct doctrines, in-
volved some measure of domestic impact.' 9 None of the early cases
rested jurisdiction solely on intranational activity. In fact, those courts
which have claimed to have relied exclusively on conduct have often gone
to great lengths to note the domestic effects of the transaction. 0
In some instances the domestic conduct involved in a transaction and
its impact on American interests are intertwined.2' Such was the case in
Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd. ,22 where the court held section 16(b) of the
17. "The Securities Exchange Act is applicable to securities transactions where (I) there
is some significant connection in the violations [sic] with the United States, and (2) the
effects of the violations are detrimental to American investors." Seizer v. Bank of' Bermuda
Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 415, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (emphasis added). "[I]t would appear that §
10(b) of the 1934 Act, and § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, cover at least charges of fraudulent
conduct in the United States resulting in sales of securities abroad which have a substantial
detrimental effect upon the interests of American investors." United States v. Clark, 359 F.
Supp. 131, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). "[I]t is clear that sufficient conduct took place within the
U.S. to allow applicability of § 10(b) beyond the U.S. and that the transaction in question
has a significant impact on American securities markets." Selas of America (Nederland)
N.V. v. Selas Corp. of America, 365 F. Supp. 1382, 1386 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
18. See, e.g., Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973);-Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part on other grounds en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
19. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018
(1975), and IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975), were the first cases which
applied the conduct doctrine without relying in part on the domestic impact of the transac-
tion. See notes 49-65 infra and accompanying text. But see notes 66-68 infra and accom-
panying text. SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977), was the first decision to employ
pure conduct analysis in the context of a transaction which had no domestic impact. See
notes 69-89 infra and accompanying text.
20. SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Finance Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963), is one
of the clearest examples of a court straining to find domestic impact while simultaneously
discounting the need to do so. The case involved a public offer to Canadians of the securities
of a Canadian corporation. After reviewing the defendants' domestic conduct, the court
properly concluded that "the scheme to defraud . . . operated and was executed in the
United States. . . as well as in Canada." Id. at 994. It was further noted that application of
the securities laws appeared proper anytime it was necessary to use facilities of interstate
commerce to carry out the fraud-a conduct test which was more than met by the facts of
this case. Nevertheless, the court seemed compelled to find some domestic impact. Taking
judicial notice of the fact that some of the Canadian newspapers which carried advertise-
ments of the offering were sold in the United States, the court reasoned that the American
public had no doubt been exposed to the offer. This in itself was deemed sufficient to invoke
the protection of American law. Id. at 994-95.
21. The most common example involves fraudulent trading on a domestic stock ex-
change. See, e.g., Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977); Straub v.
Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).
22. 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969).
SECURITIES ACTS
Exchange Act23 applicable to a Canadian corporation which had pur-
chased and sold securities on the New York Stock Exchange.2 4 Since all
of the transactions constituting the alleged violation had occurred in the
United States, the elements of the conduct doctrine Were clearly satis-
fied.Y Although most of the Second Circuit's opinion merely retraced the
district court's conduct-based analysis,2 6 the role of domestic impact in
the jurisdictional calculus was apparent. Implicit in the decision was the
belief that allowing such dealings by a foreigner would impinge on the
integrity of American securities markets. Indeed, the court noted "that
the effect of this kind of insider trading is quite as great as when the trader
is an American. " 27
Although the courts have seemed reluctant to ground jurisdiction solely
on domestic conduct, the effects doctrine has long been applied as an
independent jurisdictional base. In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook28 the court
permitted an American stockholder of a Canadian corporation to bring a
derivative suit under section 10(b)29 and rule lOb-530 against the directors
of the corporation for allegedly causing it to issue treasury shares at an
inadequate price. 31 Finding that the Exchange Act was designed to pro-
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970). Section 16(b) permits an issuer of a security to recover any
profit realized through purchases and sales of that security within a six month period by any
officer or director of the issuer or by a beneficial owner of more than 10% of any class of
equity security of the issuer.
24. This derivative action was brought on behalf of Dreyfus Corporation against The
Fund of Funds Ltd., a Canadian mutual investment company which owned over 10% of the
Dreyfus common stock. The president of the defendant corporation or his representative
placed the nine purchase and six sell orders in question through telephone calls from
Geneva, Switzerland to a broker in New York City who executed the orders. 279 F. Supp.
935, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
25. See note 14 supra.-
26. The defendant argued that it fell within the exemption of § 30(b) of the Exchange Act.
See note 9 supra. The district court held that this section exempted only activities on foreign
exchanges and'was therefore inapplicable since "the wrong complained of occurred in the
United States." 279 F. Supp. at 937. Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), was
distinguished on the basis that all the transactions in that case occurred in Canada. 279 F.
Supp. at 937. The first portion of the Second Circuit's opinion employs substantially
identical analysis. See 405 F.2d at 422.
27. Id.
28. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part on other grounds en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
31. The complaint alleged that the directors of Banff Oil Ltd., a Canadian corporation,
had conspired with the directors of Aquitane of Canada, a wholly owned subsidiary of a
French concern, and the directors of Paribas Corp., a Delaware corporation wholly owned
by a French bank, to defraud Banff by causing it to issue treasury shares at market price.
The plaintiff charged that the defendants knew, on the basis of inside information concern-
ing a recent oil discovery, that the market price was below the shares' actual value. 405 F.2d
at 204-06.
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tect the domestic securities markets and American investors who traded
in these markets, 32 the court held the act applicable to foreign transac-
tions "when the transactions involve stock registered and listed on a
national securities exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of
American investors." 3 3 Although the plaintiff neither pleaded nor proved
individual injury, the court reasoned that the fraud deprived the corpora-
tion of fair compensation for its shares, thereby reducing shareholders'
equity which would in turn lower the market price of the shares on the
domestic exchange. 34 This attenuated impact alone was deemed suffi-
ciently serious to warrant invoking the protection of the Exchange Act.'-'
Basing jurisdiction solely on domestic impact, as the court did in
Schoenbaum, carries with it the possibility of applying the securities acts
to all securities trading throughout the world where an American investor
is involved. 36 Recognizing the-doctrine's potential for abuse, the court in
Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell 37 stated that the
holding in Schoenbaum was not to be extended beyond its facts. 8 Since
the transaction in Leasco, unlike that in Schoenbaum, did not directly
involve any American security, jurisdiction would have to be based on
the defendants' domestic conduct. 39 Finding that the activities in the
United States were "an essential link" in inducing the purchase, the court
held that no principle of international law would bar the application of the
32. "We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial appli-
cation in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on
American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of
improper foreign transactions in American securities." Id. at 206.
33. Id. at 208. See Research in International Law, supra note 12, at 579.
34. 405 F.2d at 208-09. According to the complaint, the corporation had received $10
million less than the actual value of the treasury shares issued. Id. at 205.
35. Id. at 209.
36. The Restatement, which the courts have relied upon in defining the effects doctrine,
might limit the principle's application somewhat. Section 18(b) requires that the effect be
"'substantial" and "a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18(b)
(1965). However, these concepts are too vague to limit the scope of the effects doctrine with
any degree of certainty.
37. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). Leasco, an American corporation whose shares were
traded on the New York Stock Exchange, charged that defendant Robert Maxwell, a British
citizen, had fraudulently induced Leasco to purchase the stock of a British corporation on
the London Exchange. Id. at 1330.
38. Id. at 1334.
39. The alleged violation in Schoenbaum involved stock registered on an American
exchange, whereas the fraud in Leasco involved securities registered only on a foreign
exchange. Noting this difference, the court doubted whether the Exchange Act would be
applicable if all of the fraudulent conduct alleged had taken place abroad simply because the
transaction had an adverse effect on an American corporation whose stock was traded on a
domestic exchange. "When no fraud has been practiced in this country and the purchase or
sale has not been made here, we would be hard pressed to find justification for going beyond
Schoenbaum." Id.
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Exchange Act. 40 But rather than ending the analysis here, which would
have been appropriate under a pure conduct approach, the court went on
to examine the effect of the fraud on American interests to determine if
Congress would have intended American law to apply under these cir-
cumstances.4' Thus the ultimate finding of jurisdiction under the court's
purported conduct approach turned not on the defendants' activity but on
the fraud's domestic impact.
Similarly, the courts in Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd.42 and SEC v.
United Financial Group, Inc. 43 relied upon the effects doctrine to support
their conduct-based analyses. In Travis, the court spoke in terms of the
defendants' domestic conduct in upholding jurisdiction over the plain-
tiffs' first claim; 4 yet jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' second claim, which
arose out of the same transaction, was based on the domestic impact of
the fraud. 45 The loss suffered by American investors as a result of the
fraudulent transaction undoubtedly influenced the court's decision on the
40. Alternatively, the court held that the conduct doctrine would be satisfied "if defend-
ants' fraudulent acts in the United States significantly whetted (the plaintiffs'] interest" in
the transaction. Id. at 1335.
41. The court specifically stated that the case dealt "with the problem considered in the
Restatement's § 17," yet one page later the court extensively analyzed the effects of the
transaction-a consideration which is irrelevant under the conduct doctrine. Id. at 1334-35.
If the conduct doctrine had truly been followed it would have been unnecessary to deal with
the defendants' arguments that § 10(b) was inapplicable where the transaction: (1) involved
foreign securities not traded on an American exchange; or (2) involved a non-American
purchaser. The court rejected the first argument since the effect on an American investor
was the same regardless of the nature of the security. Id. at 1335-36. As to the defendants'
second argument, although the purchaser of record was a foreign corporation, because of
the involvement of the purchaser's American parent in the transaction, the court felt that "it
would be elevating form over substance to hold that this entails a conclusion that the
purchases did not have a sufficient effect in the United States to make § 10(b) apply." Id. at
1338 (emphasis added).
42. 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
43. 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973).
44. The suit was brought by American stockholders of the defendant Canadian corpora-
tion. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been fraudulently induced to retain their shares
during a favorable tender offer to Canadian shareholders and were later forced to accept a
less attractive offer from the defendants. Count I of the plaintiffs' amended complaint set
forth two separate claims: (1) misrepresentation and nondisclosure; and (2) self dealing. 473
F.2d at 519-20.
The conduct deemed sufficient to uphold jurisdiction over count one consisted mainly of
the use of the mails and other facilities of interstate commerce. Id. at 524-26. The court also
noted that the defendants had visited the United States to close the second and less
favorable tender offer. Id. at 526. It is questionable whether the activity related to this visit
should have been considered at all. The sale was closed after the true intentions of the
defendants were known and thus this domestic conduct cannot properly be said to have
been part of the scheme to defraud. The closing of the second tender offer did not further
the scheme but merely fixed the loss sustained by the plaintiffs from a fraud which had
already been consummated. As to the question of jurisdiction, such post-violation conduct
should be irrelevant. See note 63 infra.
45. 473 F.2d at 528.
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first claim.' 6 The defendants in United Financial had engaged in suffi-
cient domestic activity to justify under international law the application
of the Exchange Act. 47 Nevertheless, the court spent most of its time
searching for some effect on American interests which, coupled with the
domestic-conduct, would provide a basis for asserting jurisdiction. 48
II
BERSCH AND HT
The interplay between the effects and conduct doctrines was clarified
and a new jurisdictional calculus established in the companion cases of
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. 49 and IT v. Vencap, Ltd. 50 In Bersch a
United -States citizen brought a class action suit against a Canadian
mutual fund on behalf of all American and foreign plaintiffs. 5I Paralleling
his analysis in Leasco ,52 Judge Friendly stated that although the defend-
ants' domestic activities clearly satisfied the conduct doctrine under
international law standards, "it would be . . .erroneous to assume that
the legislature always means to go to the full extent permitted. ' 53 In
46. The -court revealed its partial reliance on the effects doctrine through its repeated
citation of those portions of the Leasco opinion in which the domestic impact of the fraud in
that case was examined. See id. at 526.
47. The fraud had been directed from the United States and facilities of interstate
commerce were used in furtherance of the scheme. 474 F.2d at 356.
48. Id. at 356-57. The court strained to find significant domestic impact. Stating that
"[t]he relative number of American citizen shareholders vis-a-vis alien shareholders is not
determinative of whether United States courts may assert jurisdiction," the court placed
great emphasis on the impact the fraud had on the three American investors whose total
holdings were under $10,000. Id.
49. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
50. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
51. The suit arose out of the sale of common stock by I.O.S., Ltd., a financial service
organization involved in the management of mutual funds which was organized under
Canadian law. The complaint alleged that the underwriters had misrepresented I.O.S. as
suitable for public ownership and that the prospectus had failed to disclose, among other
things, illegal activities by I.O.S. and its officers. 519 F.2d at 981.
52. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334-37 (2d Cir.
1972).
53. 519 F.2d at 985 (quoting Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972)). The district court judge found that: (I) the defendants held
numerous meetings in New York "to initiate, organize and structure the offering"; (2) a
New York law firm and a New York accounting firm were retained by the defendants; (3)
parts of the prospectus were drafted and reviewed in New York; and (4) accounts for the
proceeds of the offering were opened with a New York bank. Id. at 985 n.24. The court had
"no doubt that the activities within the United States. . .were sufficient to authorize the
United States to impose a rule with respect to consequences flowing from them wherever
they might appear, under the principle stated in Restatement (2d) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States § 17 .... " Id. at 985. However, the question was not one of the
court's power, but of the propriety of exercising that power. Id.
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hypothesizing what Congress would have considered the proper extrater-
ritorial scope of the securities laws, the court established a three-tiered
test. The test, in essence, applies the conduct and effects doctrines
concurrently, requiring a lesser degree of intranational conduct when the
domestic impact is great, and a lesser degree of effect when there is
substantial domestic activity. Dividing the class of plaintiffs into three
categories-resident Americans, Americans living abroad, and foreigners
outside the United States 54 -the court held that the antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws applied "to losses from sales of securities to
Americans resident in the United States whether or not acts .. . of
material importance occurred in this country . . . . 55 The impact on
American interests in such a case was so great that "merely preparatory
activities in the United States" would trigger the application of the
securities laws. 56 Since "Congress surely did not mean the securities laws
to protect the many thousands of Americans residing in foreign countries
against securities frauds by foreigners acting there," 57 jurisdiction over
suits by this class of plaintiffs would be found only if "acts ...of
material importance in the United States have significantly contributed"
to the investor's loss.5 8 Here the American interest and thus the domestic
impact was less; therefore, greater conduct was required. With regard to
foreign investors, the court for the first time applied a pure conduct test
stating that American law would not govern unless domestic activity
"directly caused" the plaintiff's lOSS. 59
The dimensions of the third standard in Bersch-the pure conduct
test-were further refined in liT, a case involving a suit by an interna-
tional investment trust organized under the laws of Luxembourg against a
Bahamian corporation. 60 Jurisdiction, the court held, could be based
solely on domestic conduct-but not just any domestic conduct.6 ' Ac-
knowledging that its holding went beyond any prior case,62 the court
stated that its ruling was limited to those instances in which the "fraudu-
54. See note 67 infra for a discussion of the equal protection problems involved in such a
classification.
55. 519 F.2d at 993.
56. Id. at 992.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 993.
59. Id.
60. lIT, one of the many mutual funds of the former I.O.S. empire, brought an action for
fraud against Vencap, Ltd., a venture capital firm. Vencap had been organized by Richard
Pistell, a United States citizen residing in the Bahamas who was the central figure in the
alleged fraud. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d at 1004-05.
61. Id. at 1017-18.
62. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d at 1018; accord, Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519
F.2d at 987.
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lent acts themselves" took place in the United States and did not extend
to those cases involving "mere preparatory activities. . . where the bulk
of the activity was performed in foreign countries .... "63 This distinc-
tion, the court believed, would prevent the United States from being used
as a base from which to perpetrate fraud on foreigners, 64 while at the
same time preventing the application of American law to every trans-
action involving some conduct in the United States. 65
The application of the conduct doctrine in Bersch and lIT does not
appear too expansive since both cases involved transactions in which
American investors had suffered financial loss. 6 Indeed, in Bersch the
jurisdictional reach of the coriduct doctrine may not have been great
enough. It seems unfair, if not a denial of equal protection, to allow
American investors to bring suit while denying that right to identically
situated foreigners. 67 Similarly a finding of jurisdiction in lIT appears
63. IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d at 1018. The court explained:
Admittedly the distinction is a fine one. But. . . the line has to be drawn somewhere
if the securities laws are not to apply in every instance where something has hap-
pened in the United States, however large the gap between the something and a
consummated fraud and however negligible the effect in the United States or on its
citizens.
Id.
This distinction made the manner in which the fraud was characterized critical. The court
hypothesized five theories of fraud under which the plaintiffs might be proceeding: (I) the
defendants had misrepresented the benefits which "preferential capital investors" would
receive; (2) the preferred stock was by itself a "device, scheme or artifice to defraud"; (3)
Vencap's organizer and IIT's management had conspired to defraud liT fundholders; (4) the
defendants had explicitly represented Vencap to be a bona fide venture capital enterprise;
and (5) liT wds suing derivatively as a stockholder of Vencap for injury done to it. Id. at
1011-14. Under the first three theories only the conduct prior to the sale was relevant to the
determination of jurisdiction. The only pre-sale activity in the United States was the
exchange of drafts of a purchase agreement which merely formalized a deal which had been
worked out in the Bahamas. This activity was deemed insufficient. On the other hand, under
theories four and five post-sale activity was relevant. Pistell's extensive operations in his
New York office after the sale were deemed to be not only "evidence of the misrepresenta-
tion but the cause of the damage." Id. at 1018. Thus jurisdiction could be found under these
two theories.
64. Id. at 1017.
65. Id. at 1019.
66. Although the fraud in both lIT and Bersch had some domestic impact, neither of the
opinions, unlike earlier cases, relied upon this impact to buttress the finding of jurisdiction.
67. Friendly's three classifications raise constitutional problems. Distinguishing between
American citizens abroad and foreigners outside the United States as the second and third
categories do, and between Americans resident in the United States and foreigners living in
America as the first classification seems to do, probably violates the equal protection clause
of the fifth amendment. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Alienage is a
suspect classification. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634 (1973). The constitutional implications of Bersch are discussed in Note,
American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REV. 553, 569
(1976); Note, Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Transnational Securities Fraud Cases, 17 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REv. 413, 433 (1976). The constitutional problems of Leasco's apparent
SECURITIES ACTS
proper since it would protect legitmate American interests. Only by
permitting the plaintiff corporation to recover could its American stock-
holders be made whole.68 However, in the context of a transaction involv-
ing no American investors and stock not registered on a national ex-
change, the application of the securities laws solely on the basis of
domestic conduct becomes more questionable. The Third Circuit's most
recent decision in this area involved just such a case.
III
SEC V. KASSER
The dispute in SEC v. Kasser69 revolved around the development of a
forestry complex in Manitoba by the Manitoba Development Fund, a
Canadian corporation created by the provincial government to oversee
the venture. The option to develop the complex had been granted to
Churchill Forest Industries, a Canadian corporation, and River Sawmills
Company, a Delaware corporation. Both companies were secretly owned
and controlled by Alexander Kasser, an American citizen. 0 The principal
financing for the project was to be provided through equity contributions
by Churchill and River and by loans from the Development Fund in
exchange for debentures issued by Churchill and River. Each loan was to
be matched by specified equity contributions by the two corporations.
The essence of the Commission's complaint was that Kasser, through an
elaborate series of bank transfers, funneled the Development Fund's loan
disbursements and income from the project into the purported equity
investments .71
Conceding that the fraud had no direct impact on American investors or
domestic securities markets, 7 the SEC asserted that the antifraud provi-
application of different standards based on nationality are examined in Comment, The
Transnational Reach of Rule lOb-5, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1376-77 (1973).
68. lIT, the plaintiff corporation, had approximately 300 American fundholders. Assum-
ing, as the court did, that the American fundholders invested proportionately more than
their foreign counterparts, the loss suffered by United States citizens could have totaled
$15,000. The court, however, discounted this impact by emphasizing the relative American
impact; United States fundholders constituted only 0.2% of the total number of investors
and suffered only 0.5% of the loss. 519 F.2d at 1016-17. Thus the court found the impact
insufficient as an independent jurisdictional base. Moreover, the effects of the transaction
were not invoked to support the conduct-based analysis. Compare the approach of the court
in United Financial, note 48 supra.
69. 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977).
70. SEC v. Kasser, 391 F. Supp. 1167, 1169, 1171 (D.N.J. 1975).
71. 548 F.2d at 111. By the time the scheme was discovered over $38 million had been
advanced by the Development Fund to Churchill in exchange for debentures with a total
face value of $40.7 million. River had issued $9.6 million worth of debentures and had
received about $7.9 million from the Development Fund. 391 F. Supp. at 1171-72.
72. Id. at 1173 & n.l. The sole victim of the fraud was the Development Fund, a
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sions of the securities acts applied to schemes devised in the United
States by Americans who utilized the facilities of interstate commerce to
further their objectives. 73 The district court twice held the defendants'
intranational conduct insufficient to sustain jurisdiction over what it
considered an essentially foreign transaction. 74
On appeal the Third Circuit reversed. Writing for the court, Judge
Adams stated that "[tihe federal securities laws . . . grant jurisdiction
. . . where at least some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme
occurs within this country. ' 75 The domestic conduct of the defendants
was found to be not merely preparatory to fraudulent acts committed
abroad but "much more substantial than the United States-based ac-
tivities in I&.- 76
Canadian corporation. None of the securities were traded on a domestic exchange and none
were held by American citizens. 548 F.2d at 113; 391 F. Supp. at 1177.
73. Id. at 1173.
74. In its first opinion, the district court held that it had no jurisdiction over what it
considered "essentially foreign transactions without impact in this country." Id. at 1177.
"It is beyond dispute that the principal objective [of the Exchange Act] is protection of
American purchasers who are exposed to fraudulent offers or sales of securities in interstate
commerce." Id. at 1175. The court distinguished United Financial, Leasco, Schoenbaum,
Travis, and Roth on the ground that those cases involved a measure of domestic impact,
Gulf International was deemed inapplicable since it involved offers made in the United
States. Id. at 1175-76.
Six weeks later, the Second Circuit handed down its decisions in Bersch and lIT. The
SEC amended its complaint and once again sought relief. After reviewing the Second
Circuit's recent decisions, the district court found that the amended complaint was also
insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction. Emphasizing that the holding of HT was
limited to cases in which the fraudulent acts were performed in the United States, the court
distinguished Kasser stating that "the alleged fraud was consummated in Canada where the
Manitoba Development Fund (MDF) transferred funds to defendants in exchange for
debentures." SEC v. Kasser, Civil Action No. 74-90, slip op. at 4 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 1975).
Moreover, the court found that:
[t]he activities conducted in the United States were more in the nature of preparatory
activities than was the case in lIT. Kasser involves a situation where the gap is large
"between the [local acts] and a consummated fraud," and where the "effect in the
United States or on its citizens" is miniscule.
Id. (quoting lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975)). The court then quoted
a hypothetical 'posed in Bersch which it found "strikingly similar" to the facts of Kasser:
"Assuming that there were no American purchasers and that the underwriting re-
lated, for example, to a large foreign country rather than with the United States...
we do not believe the activities in the United States. . . would justify an American
court in taking jurisdiction in a suit for damages by foreign plaintiffs."
Id. at 5 (quoting Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986-87 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975)).
75. 548 F.2d at 114.
76. Id. at 115. The district court noted the following domestic activities: (1) meetings in
the United States as part of the negotiations; (2) use of the New York office of a foreign
bank as a conduit for a small portion of the funds; (3) execution of one key contract; (4)
incorporation of the defendant companies in the United States; and (5) use of facilities of
interstate commerce to further the scheme. 391 F. Supp. at 1176, The circuit court added the
following conduct to the list: (1) maintenance of books and records in the United States; (2)
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Although the court made the pretense that it was merely applying well
established law,77 the opinion represents a significant extension of prior
cases in three respects. First, Kasser is the only case in which jurisdiction
was based on the conduct doctrine in the complete absence of domestic
impact. Second, the court apparently required much less domestic con-
duct in suits involving foreign losses than that demanded in Bersch and
1iT. And finally, the opinion announced new policy justifications for the
application of the securities laws in the transnational setting-policies
upon which further extraterritorial expansion can be based.
Although Bersch and 1IT held the securities laws applicable to cases
involving foreign loss only when the fraudulent act itself was committed
in this country, 78 the circuit court found it unnecessary to address the
district court's finding that the fraud had taken place in Canada.79 Judge
Adams sidestepped this previously pivotal issue in the following some-
what opaque passage:80
Not only do we believe that the sum total of the defendants' intranational
actions was substantial, but we also question whether it can be convinc-
ingly maintained that such acts within the United States did not directly
cause any extraterritorial losses. Rather, it is evident that the defendants'
conduct occurring within the borders of this nation was essential to the
plan to defraud the Fund.8'
The court seemed satisfied that the United States based conduct was
"substantial," the standard applied in Bersch only to cases involving
losses to American citizens abroad.82 Alternatively, jurisdiction could be
asserted if the domestic acts were "essential" to the fraud, the degree of
contact deemed sufficient in Leasco, a suit in which recovery was sought
for the losses sustained by an American corporation.83
In addition to lowering the amount of activity required to invoke
conduct-based jurisdiction, the court set forth three policy considerations
drafting of agreements executed outside the United States; and (3) transmittal of proceeds to
and from the United States. 548 F.2d at 111.
77. The court attempted to mold the holdings of Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591
(3d Cir. 1976), and Leasco to support its decision. 548 F.2d at 112-13, 115 n.26. A proper
reading of these cases in fact suggests that jurisdiction should have been denied in Kasser.
Straub involved a suit by a foreign plaintiff who had purchased the stock of an American
corporation on an American exchange. 540 F.2d at 595. Leasco was cited for the proposi-
tion that " 'significant' intranational conduct [is] 'sufficient' for subject-matter juris-
diction." 548 F.2d at 115 n.26. However, Leasco involved an American, not a foreign
purchaser. 468 F.2d at 1337-38.
78. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d at 993; IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d at
1018.
79. Civil Action No. 74-90, slip op. at 4 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 1975).
80. Interestingly, this is the only confusing passage of an otherwise clear opinion.
81. 548 F.2d at 115 (emphasis added).
82. 519 F.2d at 993. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
83. 468 F.2d at 1335. See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
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which, given a liberal reading, would justify the application of American
law when there was any conduct in the United States. Adopting dicta in
Bersch,84 the court found that to deny jurisdiction would, "in effect,
create a haven for . . .defrauders and manipulators." 8" In the most
colorful passage of the opinion, the court explained: "We are reluctant
to conclude that Congress intended to allow the United States to become
a 'Barbary Coast,' as it were, harboring international securities
'pirates.' "86
The court was also concerned that a holding of no jurisdiction would
induce reciprocal responses on the part of other nations and create a base
from which foreigners could export fraud to American investors. Uphold-
ing jurisdiction, on the other hand, might "encourage other nations to
take appropriate steps against parties who seek to perpetrate fraud in the
United States.' '87
The final policy justification asserted was that the "antifraud provi-
sions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts were designed to insure high standards of
conduct in securities transactions within this country in addition to pro-
tecting domestic markets and investors from the effects of fraud.' '88
Continuing with this explosively expansive language, the court reasoned
that these goals would be furthered by enabling "the SEC to police
vigorously the conduct of securities dealings within the United States." 89
IV
TOWARD A JURISDICTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The antifraud provisions of the securities acts were designed to protect
American investors and safeguard the integrity of domestic securities
exchanges. 90 Whenever either of these interests is substantially
threatened, American antifraud standards should be applied vigorously
regardless of the domestic or foreign nature of the transaction. Although
foreign laws may set a somewhat lower standard, there is little chance
that the application of the securities acts to transactions involving actual
fraudulent misrepresentations would subject foreign citizens to inconsis-
tent standards of conduct. Even in the case of intentional nondisclosure,
it is questionable whether United States courts should defer to a less
refined foreign standard where American interests are involved.
84. 519 F.2d at 987.





90. See note 7 supra.
SECURITIES ACTS
Even if American and foreign standards differed materially, other
nations would nevertheless favor United States adjudication in some
instances. Where a foreign nation cannot obtain personal jurisdiction, it
would no doubt prefer the perpetrator of a fraud to be prosecuted under
the more stringent American standard rather than have him escape prose-
cution entirely. 9' Similarly there should be no objection to injunctive
actions. Nations contemplating prosecution would welcome suits by the
SEC to freeze the assets of those allegedly involved in transnational
securities fraud. If no such means were available to prevent the dissipa-
tion of the proceeds from a fraud, any foreign judgment which might be
obtained could well be an empty one.
Although it has been argued that the extraterritorial application of
American law might offend foreign nations by subjecting their citizens to
multiple liability if United States judgments were not recognized abroad
and by forcing foreign defendants to litigate in distant forums, the re-
quirement of personal jurisdiction will minimize any such risks. The
potential defendant will often be subject to service of process in only one
country-probably the country in which it will be most convenient for
him to litigate. Where such problems do materialize, the doctrines of
forum non conveniens and comity-not subject matter jurisdiction-
should be invoked to remedy them.
One factor mitigating against the extraterritorial application of the
securities acts is judicial economy. Would Congress, if it had considered
the issue, have wished the limited resources of American courts and law
enforcement agencies to be devoted to frauds which are predominantly
foreign in nature? 92
The fact that the stock involved in the fraud was registered on a
domestic exchange in itself justifies the application of American stan-
dards, regardless of the nationalities of the parties involved and the situs
of the conduct. Here the impact on American markets is direct and
substantial, and it is likely that all parties involved in the transaction
expected United States law to govern. Transactions in securities not
registered on domestic exchanges can have a similar impact on American
markets when the sales are made under the facade of United States law.
91. The problem of obtaining personal jurisdiction is, of course, not limited to foreign
courts. For example, in SEC v. Kasser, the main culprit, Alexander Kasser, had not been
served with process. 391 F. Supp. at 1169. Foreign prosecution may also be blocked by the
failure to obtain sufficient evidence where the bulk of the activities took place outside of
that country. Canada has experienced difficulty in subpoenaing witnesses for its investiga-
tion of the Kasser fraud. See In re Letters of Request to Examine Witnesses from the Court
of Queen's Bench for Manitoba, Canada, 59 F.R.D. 625 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 488 F.2d 511 (9th
Cir. 1973).
92. 519 F.2d at 985.
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Schemes involving stock which is falsely represented as being registered
on a United States exchange, or otherwise subject to American regula-
tion, impair the attractiveness of domestic markets almost as much as
fraudulent transactions in securities which are in fact so registered. Thus
the federal courts should assert jurisdiction in such cases. 93 Similarly
investors might be misled by the use of American banks and accounting
firms during the course of the transaction. Although the incidental use of
the resources of the American financial community does not justify
invoking United States law, when these relationships were touted to give
the transaction an aura of American approval the provisions of the securi-
ties acts should be invoked. The integrity of American financial institu-
tions must be maintained if the reputation of domestic markets is to be
preserved.
The question of when to invoke United States law to protect American
investors is more difficult. Certainly the antifraud provisions of the acts
should govern the domestic sale of any security to an American resident.
But when the transaction occurs abroad, it is unlikely that the parties
would expect any dispute arising from the sale to be adjudicated in
American courts under American law. Unless no other forum were avail-
able, the federal courts would be wise to defer to foreign courts. in the
interests of judicial economy.
Fraud involving domestic conduct, but no domestic impact, should
generally be adjudicated in foreign courts. Such pure conduct cases
would arise when the United States situs of the activity was merely
fortuitous or when the transaction's ties with the United States were not
used to induce others into believing that the sale was governed by Ameri-
can law. In the absence of domestic effect, only when foreign prosecution
is unlikely-for example, if the foreign nation can not obtain personal
jurisdiction or gather sufficient evidence-will the interest in conserving
scarce judicial resources be outweighed.
93. In Wandschneider v. Industrial Incomes Incorporated of North America, [1972] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,422 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the prospectus emphasized that the issuer
was registered with and subject to regulation by the SEC, was a member of NASD, and had
regularly filed audited financial statements with the SEC. Only near the end of the prospec-
tus was it mentioned that the stock involved in this issuing was not registered under the
Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 92,059. The German nationals who purchased the stock
undoubtedly believed that the sale was subject to the high American standards of honesty
and fair dealing. Permitting this type of fraud would destroy foreign investors' confidence in
the American markets. In Finch v. Marathon Securities Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), the purchase agreement stated that the sale was governed by the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, the Securities Act of 1933, and the Exchange Act of 1934, to the extent
that the transaction was within the purview of the acts. Id. at 1347-48. Here too the sale was
cloaked with the aura of American regulation; therefore, United States law should have
been applied.
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Thus, although the policy justifications posited by the Kasser court are
overly broad, the result is the correct one. Under a liberal reading of the
policies set forth in Kasser, federal courts would be compelled to hear all
securities disputes involving some conduct in the United States: a Japa-
nese and a German businessman meeting in New York to conduct busi-
ness in foreign securities would be subject to the securities acts and could
adjudicate their disputes in American courts. 94 The facts of Kasser,
however, justified the court's finding of jurisdiction. Canada was experi-
encing difficulty in obtaining witnesses for its investigation, which sug-
gested that successful Canadian prosecution was unlikely. 95 Moreover, a
substantial part of the proceeds of the fraud was apparently transmitted
to the United States. 96 Prompt action by the SEC would prevent the
dissipation of these funds. Under these circumstances the American
courts had the duty to hear the case and ensure that the investor is
protected.
CONCLUSION
- The federal courts have continually expanded the extraterritorial scope
of the securities acts. Although the early cases seemed reluctant to base
jurisdiction solely on conduct, more recent decisions have applied the
conduct and effects doctrines alternatively. Generally the securities acts
should be applied to all securities fraud having an impact on domestic
markets or American investors-regardless of the foreign or domestic
nature of the transaction. If the sale involves only domestic conduct,
American courts should usually defer to foreign forums except when
foreign prosection is unlikely because of the lack of evidence or personal
jurisdiction, or when any foreign judgment would be nugatory because
the proceeds of the fraud are beyond the reach of the foreign court.
Judson J. Wambold
94. Judge Friendly posited this hypothetical in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.
v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1338 (2d Cir. 1972).
95. See note 91 supra.
96. Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission at 17, SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109
(3d Cir. 1977).
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